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Reliable authentication of communicating entities is essential for achiev-
ing security in a distributed computing environment. The design of such 
systems as Kerberos, SPX and more recently KryptoKnight and Ku-
peree, have largely been successful in addressing the problem. The com-
mon element with these implementations is the need for a trusted third-
party authentication service. This essentially requires a great deal of 
trust to be invested in the authentication server which adds a level of 
complexity and reduces system flexibility. 
The use of a Beacon to promote trust between communicating parties 
was first suggested by M. Rabin in "Transactions protected by beacons," 
Journal of Computer and System Sciences, Vol 27, pp 256-267, 1983. In 
this paper we revive Rabin's ideas which have been largely overlooked in 
the past decade. In particular we present a novel approach to the authen-
tication problem based on a service called Beacon which continuously 
broadcasts certified nonces. We argue that this approach considerably 
sUnplifies the solution to the authentication problem and we illustrate 
the impact of such a service by "Beaconizing" the well know Needham 
and Schroeder protocol. The modified protocol would be suitable for de-
ployment at upper layers of the communication stack. 
Term Index: Beacon, Authentication, Network Security, Information Se-
curity, Security Protocol. 
1 Introduction 
In the past thirty years the rapid evolution of electronic data communication 
has been breath taking. This growth and reliance on electronic communication 
has increased concern about data privacy and integrity. Much effort is currently 
being devoted to providing security services for a variety of communication en-
vironments. Authentication is universally acknowledged as being essential for 
secure communications in a distributed system. 
Informally, authentication is the capability of the recipient of a communica-
tion to be able to verify that the message did come from the alleged sender. As 
a further requirement, it is usual to expect such systems to perform verification 
over an open insecure network. This requirement constrains the authentication 
system in the following manner: 
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Reliance must not be placed in the physical security of all hosts 10 the 
distributed system. 
It should be assumed that packets traveling along the network can be read, 
modified and inserted with little effort by an adversary. 
Trust cannot be based on the senders' address. 
Trust cannot be based on the senders' operating system security. 
Currently, the dominant authentication protocols employed in a client-server 
environment use a broker to arbitrate between principals who wish to com-
municate. In such a scheme, a principal must first contact the broker to obtain 
credentials which can be trusted by its communicating partner. The protocol will 
typically rely on an exchange of cryptographic messages and the participant's 
knowledge of some secret. Well known examples of such systems are Kerberos 
[16,7,2]' SPX [17], KryptoKnight [8] and Kuperee [6]. 
In this paper we present a novel approach to the authentication problem for 
a distributed computer system using a public key cryptographic system and we 
introduce a new service called Beacon which has been inspired by Rabin [12]. A 
Beacon broadcasts, at regular intervals, certified nonces which are accessible to 
all hosts within the network. In section 3 we give a brief description of Rabin's 
use of Beacons. In section 4 the approach taken in this paper is described. 
As a means of contrasting the Beacon based approach to authentication with 
the more established authentication protocols, in section 5 we "beaconize" the 
very well known Needham and Schroeder public key protocol. We assume that 
the reader is familiar with the basic philosophy of Needham and Schroeder. For 
a complete description of the protocol we would direct the reader to [9]. 
In section 6 we discuss the advantages of the beaconized approach. The paper 
finally closes in section 7 with some concluding remarks. 
2 Conventions 
Throughout this paper ~ertain terms are used which may appear to be ambiguous 
or new to readers. In the following section the use of these terms, in the context 
of this document, are stated. This should avoid any difficulty caused by their 
being used differently elsewhere. 
2.1 Terminology 
A host is a computer with a unique address which is connected to a computer 
network. 
The user is the human being who is using some services provided by the net-
work. All programs in the system are initiated by users. The main purpose of 
authentication is to verify the identity of the users within a network. 
A client is a program which runs on behalf of a user in order to request some 
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service that is available on a remote host. Since the client runs on a user's behalf, 
it assumes the user identity and privileges. Any action taken by a client is said 
to have been carried out by the user. 
The server is a program which provides a service to a client on the network. 
It is usually installed by the system administrator and runs on behalf of the 
system. A server remains active in a network for much longer than a client and 
thus is given an identity. Each server is therefore registered with the system, in a 
similar manner to a user, and must prove its identity before a client will accept it. 
Any communicating network entity, that is client or server, can be referred to 
as a principal. 
A realm is organized in a hierarchical structure and has a strong analogy to 
domains in Internet. A single authentication server, be it a Beacon or Third-
party Authenticator, is responsible for all local principals. This collection of 
network entities, the authentication server and its clients, are referred to as a 
realm. A client who wishes to obtain some service from a server within the same 
realm would use the service to prove its identity. 
2.2 Cryptographic Requirements 
The Beacon based system relies on a public key (or asymmetric) cryptographic 
system. Many such systems have been designed and examples of such schemes 
can be found in [19, 15]. For the purpose of our discussion the system's crypto-
graphic requirements can be simplified and kept generic. 
A public key system differs from a secret key (or symmetric) system in that 
each principal in the distributed system has a pair of keys. The calculation of 
this private and public key pair, given the initial conditions, is easy. However, 
it would be infeasible for an adversary who knows a public key to calculate the 
secret key or the initial conditions. Each principal has a private key which is 
kept secret and is only known to that principal. The corresponding public key 
is made available to all other principals. In the remainder of this paper "{} z" 
means encipher with key Z. The private and public key pair will be denoted as 
"X" and "Y" respectively and subscripts will be used to identify the associated 
principal. Thus the Beacon would have a key pair XBN, YBN, the principal, 
Alice, would have the pair XA, YA while Bob would have XB, YB. 
The advantage of a public key system is that it supports secrecy, authentica-
tion, and integrity. Communication secrecy is supported by the transformations: 
M = {{M}yBlxB 
That is, suppose Alice wishes to send a secret message, M, to Bob. Then 
Alice must have access to Bob's public key and encipher the message, thus: 
c= {M}YB 
128 
Alice sends Bob the cryptographic string C. On receipt Bob is able to employ 
his private key to decipher the message. 
{C}XB = {{M}yBhB = M 
The encryption and decryption processes are easy using the appropriate keys. 
However, it would be infeasible for an adversary to decipher C without the 
private key· XB, ensuring secrecy. Now, since YB is publicly known, Bob has no 
way of being certain of the sender's identity. Thus authenticity has not been 
assured using this method. 
Authentication, using a public key system, is satisfied by the following trans-
formation. 
Alice is able to "sign" her message to Bob by using her private key, X A : 
C= {MhA 
Bob is able to verify that the message could have only come from Alice by 
deciphering the message using Alice's public key, YA , thus: 
If the message is plain-text, Bob knows that C has in fact not been altered. 
However, if the message, or any portion of the message, is a random string then 
it may be difficult for Bob to ascertain that the message has not been altered 
merely by examining it. For this reason it is more usual for Alice to employ a 
suitable one-way hashing function (eg. [14, 18]) to produce a Message Digest 
(MD). Alice would sign the MD with her private key and append it to the 
message. On receiving the message, Bob is able to reproduce the MD in order to 
confirm that the message is from Alice and that it has not been altered. Finally, 
all three can be employed by Alice to communicate securely with Bob thus: 
3 Rabin's Approach Using Beacons 
The use of a Beacon as a security service within a distributed computer system 
was first suggested by M. Rabin [12]. He defined a Beacon as emitting, at reg-
ular intervals, a random integer sealed using a suitable cryptographic signature 
system. The integer would be selected randomly and uniformly within the range 
1 to N, where N is publicly known. With this basic concept he proposed two 
protocols based on a probabilistic approach, one for the signing of contracts and 
the second for information disclosure. In the following section Rabin's use of 
Beacons is illustrated by briefly outlining the contract signing protocol. For a 
full account, the reader is referred to the original paper. 
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Consider, Alice and Bob have negotiated a contract over a computer network 
and are ready to exchange signed copies. It is not possible for them to meet and 
they wish to use the network to make the exchange electronically. We can as-
sume that the contracts can be signed by a suitable electronic signature scheme. 
The problem addressed by Rabin was, if Alice signs and sends the contract to 
Bob, 'then Alice is committed, but Bob is not. Bob could take the opportunity 
to look for a better deal, leaving Alice vulnerable. A similar argument can be 
made about Bob. 
In Rabin's protocol we can assume the following initial conditions: 
- Each of the participants has an asymmetric cryptographic key pair which can 
be used for signing messages and verifying signatures. The Beacon has the 
private and public key pair XBN, YBN, Alice's keys are XA, YA and Bob's 
are XB, YB. The public keys, YBN, YA and YB are widely known and are 
available to the participants. Each participant's private key has been kept 
secret and is known only to its owner. 
- The Beacon broadcasts a token, T every ~ seconds and the next broadcast 
will be at time t +~. The T has the following form: 
T = {t, i}XBN 
where t is the time at which the token was emitted and i is a randomly 
selected integer between 1 and N. The value of N is publicly known. The 
Beacon seals the token using its private key XBN. 
- Alice and Bob have agreed to the contract name, C, such that: 
C = h(contract) 
where a suitable hash function h is applied to the text of the contract and 
the obtained result is used to denote the contract. 
- Alice and Bob have agreed and signed preliminary agreements. We will refer 
to these agreements signed by Alice and Bob as PA and PB respectively. The 
text of PAis as follows: 
{If Bob can produce (e, T) signed by Alice and T signed by the Beacon for 
some token T, then I, Alice will be committed to the contract as of the time 
t mentioned in the token T. }XA 
Bob signs a similar contract with the name Alice and Bob exchanged. Since 
this agreement does not bind either party to the contract, it reasonable to 
assume that this initial exchange will pass off without incident. 
The protocol for the exchange of contracts requires that both parties follow 
a timed sequence. The exchange is aborted if one party fails to transmit the 
specified message within the allocated time. The exchange takes place in the 
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time between Beacon broadcasts. This time ..:1 is divided in six equal segment. 
The protocol is as follows: 
l. t ? time ~ t + ~..:1 Alice => Bob: PA 
2. Bob => Alice: PB 
3. t + ~..:1 ? time ~ t + 1..:1 Alice => Bob: iA 
4. t + 1..:1 ? time ~ t + ~..:1 Bob => Alice: iB 
5. i = iA + iBmodN 
6. t + ~..:1 ? time ~ t + ~..:1 Alice => Bob: {C, i, t + ..:1} XA 
7. Bob => Alice: {C,i,t+..:1}XB 
Within the first segment (steps 1 and 2) the two parties are required to 
exchange the preliminary contract. In the next two segments both Alice and 
Bob exchange random numbers which each has generated independently, that 
is iA and iB. Each party is then able to calculate i. Finally, (steps 6 and 7) 
the two parties sign and exchange the messages which could bind them to the 
contract. These messages contain the contract name, C, and possibly the next 
token. If neither party has cheated and the next token emitted by the Beacon 
contains i, then both parties are committed to the contract at the same time. If 
the next emitted token does not contain i, then neither party is committed and 
steps 3 to 7 have to be repeated. Rabin showed that in such an exchange there 
is a probability of 1/ N that one of the parties could cheat successfully. 
4 Beacons 
Rabin's novel ideas on the use of beacons have been largely overlooked by the 
research community during the past decade. We revive these ideas by transferring 
them to the authentication problem. The following is a more detailed description 
of the concept, feasibility and implementation of a Beacon. 
A Beacon, within the context of this paper, is a service which is provided 
by a secure host in a computer network. The Beacon broadcasts, at regular 
intervals, a nonce encapsulated within a certified token. The emitted token would 
be accessible to all hosts on the network and each host maintains a short list of 
fresh tokens. The additional load caused by this service would be small as each 
host is only required to listen for a short and relatively infrequent message. 
4.1 Token 
The token has the following form: 
Ni, time,/i/e, {M D}XBN 
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where: 
Ni -+ is a freshly generated nonce. 
time -+ is the time at which the token was emitted. 
life -+ is the time after which the token will not be valid. 
M D -+ is the message digest. 
XBN -+ is the Beacon's secret encryption key which is used to certify the 
token. 
Each host which receives the token is able to verify its validity by decrypting 
the MD using the Beacon's public key. The MD ensures that the token has not 
been tampered with. Since the token is signed with the Beacon's secret key it is 
reasonable to assume the token originated from the Beacon. Each host is able to 
main~ain, on behalf of its principals, a short list of currently valid tokens. Thus 
these tokens are available to all principals to use in the authentication process. 
4.2 Network Synchronization 
There is reliance within a Beacon based system that each principal has access to 
a stable clock and that these clocks are to some extent synchronized. Since the 
life of a token can be relatively long, sayan hour, differences of a few seconds 
between the hosts can be tolerated. In this section we examine the Internet's 
Network Time Protocol (NTP) to show that in fact it is feasible to have much 
closer synchronization between communication hosts. 
Any attempt to synchronize communicating entities requires access to an 
accurate standard. Since 1972 the time standard for the world has been based 
on International Atomic Time which is currently maintained to an accuracy of 
a few parts in 1012 [1]. Many countries operate standard time and frequency 
broadcast stations which collectively cover most areas of the world. 
The network time protocol (NTP) is an Internet standard protocol [13] which 
is used to maintain a network of time servers, accessible over normal Internet 
paths. Even though transmission delays over Internet can vary widely, due to 
fluctuations in traffic loads and dynamic message routing, NTP acts to pro-
vide global synchronization. NTP is built on Internet's User Datagram Protocol 
(UDP) [11] which provides a connectionless transport mechanism. 
The NTP system consists of a network of primary and an estimated total of 
over 2000 secondary time servers. Primary time servers are directly synchronized 
by reference source, usually a time code receiver, or a calibrated atomic clock. 
Secondary time servers are synchronized by either a primary server or another 
secondary time servers. Due to the wide dispersal of these servers, access is 
available using some thousands of routes over hundreds of networks, making the 
system very reliable. 
In a typical configuration used at the University of Illinois and the University 
of Delaware, the institutions operate three campus servers. These servers are 
synchronized using two primary servers and each other. The three campus servers 
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in turn provide synchronization for department servers which then deliver time 
to remaining hosts. In such a configuration, several hundred synchronization 
milliseconds-seconds would not be uncommon. 
4.3 Creating a Beacon 
As stated above, a Beacon is a service which, at regular intervals, emits a token 
which can be authenticated. The emitted token must be accessible to all hosts 
on the network and each host is required to maintain a short list offresh tokens. 
Since the broadcast is short and relatively infrequent, implementation is quite 
feasible in either software or hardware. Algorithm 1 shows the functionality. 
Algorithm 1 Beacon(} 
1. t = clock + Ll 
2. Nj =GO 
3. M Dj = h(t, life, Nd 
4. T= t,life,Nj,{MDdxBN 
5. while (clock < t) wait 
6. broadcast(T) 
7. goto(l) 
end 
The aigorithm begins by setting, t, the time for the next broadcast. Next, the 
token is constructed prior to broadcasting (steps 2 to 4). The cryptographically 
strong pseudo-random generator, GO, is used to create a nonce Nj. The final 
component required to create the token is the message digest (MD). The one-
way hash function, h, is employed to compress the bit string created by the 
concatenation of the broadcast time, t, the token life, I and the nonce Nj. The 
output, which is of a fixed length, is used as the MD. The token, T consists of 
the MD, M Dj, signed with the Beacon's private key and the other three fields. 
The token is broadcast at time t (steps 5 and 6). The algorithm is then repeated 
(step 7). 
4.4 One-time Token 
It is generally accepted that the beneficial features of a public key cryptosystem 
are bought at the expense of speed. At present it is not feasible to use a public 
key system for bulk encryption. In practice, however, it is quite desirable to 
create a hybrid system in which a public key system is used for authentication 
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and distribution of a session key. The session key would then be used by the two 
principals to communicate securely using a symmetric key system. 
With a Beacon based system, a "one-time token" can be used to simplify 
the process. By one-time token it is meant that a token emitted by the Beacon 
can be used only once to obtain service from a particular server; much like an 
admission ticket to a theatre. Once the token has been presented, it is marked 
and will not be accepted by that server on any subsequent occasion. The process 
of marking tokens is much easier for the server than maintaining a database of 
prior requests. The use of one-time tokens eliminates the possibility of a replay 
attack and thus simplifies the process. 
To illustrate the process consider a very simple case. Alice wishes to com-
municate securely with Bob. In this case Bob can be thought of as being the 
server and Alice the client. Assume, for simplicity, that Alice and Bob commu-
nicated yesterday and they are both certain that each knows the other's public 
key. Such an occurrence is not uncommon in a distributed system since most 
principals communicate within a small group and a cache is commonly used to 
store commonly used keys. The process has two steps: 
1. Alice => Bob: Alice,Nj, {KA,BhB' {M D}XA 
Alice initiates the exchange by sending Bob a message which contains her 
n'ame, the nonce Nj , and a session key KA,B. The session key is created by 
Alice, and will be used with a symmetric cryptographic system to secure 
subsequent messages. Since the session key is the secret in the message, it 
is the only part that is enciphered with Bob's public key, YB . The nonce, 
Nj, is selected at random by Alice from the list of active tokens and ensures 
message freshness. The message integrity is protected using a MD which is 
signed by Alice. 
2. Bob => Alice: {NdKA,B 
Bob, having received the request for communication, can confirm that the 
message did come from Alice and that it has not been altered. The freshness 
of the message is guaranteed by the use of a nonce, Nj, which was recently 
broadcast by the Beacon. Since the nonce can be used only once there is 
of course a finite probability that the nonce chosen. by the Alice from the 
active list has already been presented to Bob by someone else. In such a 
case the request would be rejected and Alice would have to re-apply with 
another nonce. The probability of such a collision occurring is dependent on 
factors such as network load, token frequency and token life. In practical 
applications the additional load caused by this effect should be minimal. 
Having received a session key which he can trust, Bob completes the protocol 
by authenticating himself to Alice. He enciphers the nonce with a session key 
and sends it to Alice. Since only Bob could have obtained session key, the 
message proves Bob's identity. 
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5 Beaconizing the Needham and Schroeder Protocol 
The Needham and Schroeder (NS) protocol [9] is arguably one of the best known 
authentication and key distribution protocols. It has been the basis of a number 
of systems which use the nonce to prove freshness. In 1981 Denning and Sacco [5} 
pointed out a weakness in the NS protocol and suggested the use of time-stamped 
certificates to guard against a replay attack. Since that time authentication 
protocols have been divided into two groups, one preferring the use of nonces 
and the other preferring time-stamps. 
In this section we briefly outline the NS protocol using asymmetric keys. 
Next we will describe the weakness pointed out by Denning and Sacco and their 
solution to the problem. For a complete description the reader is directed to 
the original papers [9J and [5J. We will then modify the NS protocol to take 
advantage of a Beacon. We will show that the modified protocol simplifies the 
solution to the authentication problem and has advantages over both the NS 
protocol and modified protocol suggested by Denning and Sacco. 
5.1 Needham and Schroeder Protocol 
The NS protocol requires a trusted authentication server (AS) to establish trust 
between two principals wishing to communicate. Each principal within a realm 
which is dominated by a particular AS, is required to register his or her public 
key with that AS. To establish trust between principals, the AS must have the 
trust of all principals within its realm, to maintain and distribute these keys 
reliably. 
The NS protocol can be divided in to distinct sections. The following illus-
trates the two protocol sections. 
Public Key Distribution Protocol 
Consider the situation where Alice wishes to communicate with Bob but is not 
certain of his public key. Thus she must apply to the AS to obtain Bob's public 
key. The steps required are as follows: 
1. Alice => AS: Alice,Bob 
Alice sends a message to the AS requesting the public key. The requesting 
message is in clear text and is the names of both principals. 
2. AS => Alice: {Bob,YB}xAs 
The AS responds with a message containing the requested public key and 
is signed with the AS's private key. The message contains the name of the 
key's owner which allows Alice to verify that the reply contains the correct 
key. 
This exchange does not by itself provide any assurance that the request was 
initiated by Alice nor of the freshness of the AS's reply. 
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Connection Protocol 
Assuming that both Alice and Bob are able to obtain any required keys from 
the AS, the following are the steps required for them to authenticate each other 
in order to establish a conversation. Alice is the initiator. 
1. Alice => Bob: {NA,AlicehB 
Alice is able initiate the authentication process by sending Bob a message 
which contains a nonce, N A, and her identity. The message is enciphered 
with Bob's public key, YB, which means only Bob will be able to access NA . 
2. Bob => Alice: {NA,NBh" 
Qn receiving the message, Bob obtains the nonce N A. However, Bob cannot 
be certain of freshness nor of the identity of the actual sender. To verify 
identity and guard against a replay attack, Bob generates a nonce, N B, and 
sends it to Alice. Bob also proves his identity to Alice by including N A in 
the reply. The message to Alice is encrypted with Alice's public key. 
3. Alice => Bob: {NBhB 
As a final step in this authentication process, Alice proves her identity to 
Bob by returning NB' 
5.2 Denning and Sacco's Modification 
In [5] Denning and Sacco analyzed the protocol and pointed out that it is only 
secure while there hasn't been a key compromise. The solution suggested by 
Denning and Sacco uses time stamped certificates. The form of these certificates 
is as follows: 
where: 
P -+ is the principal's identification. 
Yp -+ is the public key belonging to principal P. 
T -+ is the time at which the certificate was issued. 
XAS -+ is the AS's private key which is used to sign the certificate. 
The Denning and Sacco modified protocol combines the authentication and 
key distribution into a single process. That is, if the principals are able to obtain 
public keys reliably and message freshness can be guaranteed, then the commu-
nicating principals are able to use the features of their public key cryptographic 
system to authenticate messages. The steps of the modified protocol are as fol-
lows: 
1. Alice => AS: Alice,Bob 
As before, Alice sends a request for two certificates, one containing Bob's 
public key and the other containing Alice's public key. 
2. AS => Alice: GA,GB 
The AS responds with a message containing two signed certificates. GA con-
tains Alice's public key and GB contains Bob's. . 
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3. Alice::} Bob: GA,GB 
Alice initiates the conversation with Bob by sending the certificates. Since 
the certificates are signed by the AS and contain a time-stamp to prove 
freshness, Bob is able to trust them. 
In [5] Denning and Sacco point out that in order for Alice to obtain the 
certificates and deliver them to Bob, the certificates must have a lifetime. By 
this it is meant that the certificates must be valid for a duration of time. The 
length of the certificate lifetime would depend on factors such as the synchroniza-
tion discrepancy between hosts and communication delays. During this period 
the protocol is vulnerable to a replay attack. Thus if the certificate lifetime is 
kept short, the protocol reduces the likelihood of a replay attack, but does not 
eliminate it. 
Another feature of the modified protocol is that principals are no longer able 
to cache commonly used keys. Since the certificate lifetime must be kept short 
to minimize the risk of a replay attack, the AS must initiate all conversations. 
5.3 A Beacon Based Approach 
We now introduce a Beacon to the distributed system and modify the NS proto-
col to take advantage of the new service. As in the unmodified NS protocol, the 
beaconized protocol can be divided into two sections. The first enables a princi-
pal to obtain another's public key. The second, the connection protocol, is used 
by a principal to initiate a conversation. We end this section by modifying the 
connection protocol to include the distribution of a symmetric session key. Once 
again we will use the over worked principals, Alice and Bob, to demonstrate the 
protocol features. 
Public Key Distribution Protocol 
The following are the steps required for Alice to obtain Bob's public key. 
1. Alice::} AS: Alice,Bob 
Alice sends a message to the AS stating her name is Alice and requesting 
Bob's public key. The message is in plain-text and only contains the two 
identities. 
2. AS::} Alice: Bob,YB,N,,{MD}xAs 
Since the reply to Alice contains no secret information, the message is not 
enciphered. As in the NS protocol the message contains the requested public 
key and the name of the key's owner. This ensures that the request made by 
Alice has not been altered. The nonce, N" is picked randomly by the Beacon 
from the list of active tokens and is used to guarantee that this message is 
not a replay. The message integrity is ensured by the MD which is signed by 
the AS. 
Since the Beacon based system uses the concept of a "one-time token" , if N, 
has previously been presented to Alice, then it would have been marked and con-
sequently the AS's reply would be rejected. In such circumstances, Alice would 
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have to reinitated the request. The probability of such a collision occurring, in 
a practical application, is quite low. 
Connection Protocol 
Assuming that both Alice and Bob are able to obtain the required keys, the 
following is the step required for Alice to initiate a conversation. 
1. Alice => Bob: Alice,Nj,{MD}x" 
Alice initiates the exchange by sending Bob a message which contains her 
name and the nonce, Nj. The nonce is selected at random by Alice from the 
list of active tokens and is used to ensures message freshness. The message 
integrity is protected using a MD which is signed by Alice. Since the message 
contains no secret information it is not encrypted with Bob's public key. 
If Nj has previously been presented to Bob, then it would have been marked 
and the request for connection would be rejected. In such an event Bob would 
reply with an error message and Alice would select another nonce and reinitiate 
the request. 
Distribution of a Symmetric key. 
At present it is not feasible to use a public key system for bulk encryption. Thus, 
it is quite desirable to create a hybrid system in which a public key system is 
used for authentication and distribution of a session key. The session key would 
then be used by the two principals to communicate securely using a symmetric 
key system. We now modify the protocol to allow the two principals, Alice and 
Bob, to share a session key. 
1. Alice => Bob: Alice,Nk, {KA,B}YB' {MD}xA 
Alice would initiate such an exchange by sending Bob a message containing 
her name, the nonce N.c, and the session key, KA,B. Once again Nk is used 
to ensure freshness. Since the session key is the only secret in the message, 
it is the only part that is enciphered with Bob's public key, YB.The message 
integrity is protected using a MD which is signed by Alice. 
5.4 Attacks on the Modified Protocol 
The attacks that can be launched against the beaconized protocol can be broken 
up in to six categories. In the following section the effects of these are discussed 
in turn. 
- In a masquerade attack, an adversary attempts to impersonate one of the 
principals in the system. Since the principal's secret key is used to prove its 
identity, for such an attack to succeed an adversary would require knowledge 
of such a key. If a principal's secret key were to be compromised, it is possible 
that an adversary could masquerade as that principal while the problem was 
undetected and before a new key was distributed. However, unlike the case 
of the NS protocol, an adversary is unable to block the distribution of new 
keys. 
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By eavesdropping (or monitoring) network traffic, an adversary hopes to gain 
some advantage or learn some secret. Since the public key protocol does not 
require the transmission of any secret information, such an attack cannot 
succeed. In the case of the hybrid system, the session key is enciphered. 
Thus an adversary would require knowledge of the deciphering key. 
- The goal of a replay attack is to gain some advantage or secret knowledge 
by retransmitting a message which was intercepted earlier. There are three 
distinct areas in which a replay attack could be attempted. They are: 
1. The token transmitted by the Beacon. The purpose of this message is to 
broadcast a unique token to all hosts on the network. Since the token has 
a finite life, if an expired token were retransmitted, the message would 
simply be discarded. Replaying the message before the token expires 
gains no advantage for the adversary as the duplicate token would be 
detected and thus discarded. 
2. The second attempt could be made against the public key distribution 
portion of the protocol. The protocol consists of two message. The effect 
of replaying these would be: 
• The protocol is initiated by a principal request another principal's 
public key. The request is in plain-text and is directed to the AS. 
Since the information is public and service is freely available, the 
adversary can gain nothing new . 
• The reply from the AS contains the requested public key. Since the 
message is unique; in that it contains the name of the recipient, a 
one-time nonce and is signed by the sender, a replayed message would 
be detected. 
3. The final message that could be replayed is the request for connection. 
This message is also unique, thus a replayed message would be detected 
and the attack would fail. 
A modification attack is an attempt to change the contents of packets as they 
travel across the computer network. For such an attack to succeed the change 
must be undetected. Such an attack would be futile because the recipient of 
a message is always able to detect any changes. 
An attempt to delay authentication messages would cause the token to expire 
and prevent the principal from completing the authentication process. Such 
an attack would have the same results as "denial of service". 
A denial of service attack could be launched by an adversary who is able to 
hinder communications in some manner. Detection and countering of such 
an attack is best dealt with by other means, such as statistical monitoring 
of the network. 
6 Discussion on Advantages 
At present there are two dominant approaches to guaranteeing message freshness 
within authentication schemes; the method favored by Needham and Schroeder 
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requires that principals generate and exchange nonces. The second method which 
has been suggested by Denning and Sacco makes use of a timestamp within 
certificates that are fabricated by the authentication server. In this section we 
discuss the five main advantages gained by the use of a beaconized approach. 
We will compare our approach with these well known protocols. 
- The Needham and Schroeder (NS) protocol has been the basis for a num-
ber of systems. The approach taken by them requires principals, wishing to 
establish a conversation, to engage in a three step message exchange. The 
purpose of this exchange is to ascertain the identity of the other principal 
and to guard against a replay attack. The distribution of public keys is pro-
vided by a trusted authentication server, AS. In the worst case, where both 
principals require the services of the AS to obtain public keys, the protocol 
requires a total of seven messages to be exchanged. 
In Denning and Sacco's modified protocol (DS) principals are required to ob-
tain certificates from the authentication server. One benefit of this approach 
is that the number of messages required to initiate a conversation is reduced 
to three. 
The beaconized protocol allows principals with cached keys to initiate a con-
version with a single message. The procedure for a principal to acquire the 
public key of a communicating partner requires two steps. 
- In [5], Denning and Sacco pointed out that the NS protocol is vulnerable to 
a replay attack in the event that a principal's key is compromised. To over 
come this difficulty, they suggested the use of time-stamped certificates. The 
resulting protocol requires a principal who wishes to initiate a conversation, 
to contact the AS to obtain two certificates; one for each principal. Each 
certificate has a finite life and contains a public key. During the period be-
tween the certificate being issued and expiring, the DS protocol is also is 
vulnerable to a replay attack. Kerberos [16, 7, 2] is the best known imple-
mentation of timestamp certificates and uses the symmetric key version of 
the DS protocol [5]. In practice the duration of an authenticator within Ker-
beros is typically five minutes [3]. The DS protocol does not eliminate the 
possibility of a replay attack, but reduces it. 
The beaconize protocol's use of one-time token eliminates the possibility of 
a replay attack without the increased steps that are suggested within the NS 
protocol. 
- Another feature of the DS protocol is that principals are no longer able to 
cache commonly used keys. The beaconized approach, like the NS protocol, 
allows principals to cache commonly used keys which results in the reduction 
of network traffic and load on the authentication server. 
- Within the DS protocol the certificate lifetime must be kept short to min-
imize the risk of a replay attack, the AS must initiate most (if not all) at-
tempts to communicate. Consequently, a greater amount of trust is invested 
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in the AS and the realm now has a single point of failure. 
The beaconized approach reduces the role of the AS to simply being a dis-
tributor of public keys which was suggested in the original NS protocol. 
- In response to the criticism made in [5] Needham and Schroeder suggested a 
modification to their original protocol [10]. The revised NS protocol guards 
against the redistribution of a compromised key by requiring the principals 
to include a nonce in their communications with the authentication server. 
The purpose of this nonce is to reassure each principal that the message 
received from the authentication server is fresh. This revision adds a small 
amount of load to principals engaged in initiating a conversation. 
In contrast the beaconized approach does not require each principal to have 
the ability to generate nonces. It would be fair to say that this advantage 
is offset within the overall system by the additional load caused by the in-
troduction of a Beacon. However, within a practical environment there are 
likely to be principals of varying abilities and it would be preferable if the 
generation of good quality nonces was provided by a single service. 
7 Concluding Remarks 
In this paper we have attempted to revive Rabin's ideas regarding beacons and 
have shown that the use of Beacons can simplify authentication in a distributed 
system. 
The fundamental difference between our approach and that more tradition-
ally taken is the use of a Beacon to deliver a "one-time token" to each host. 
This simplifies the authentication process by taking advantage of the features 
of a public key cryptographic system. In contrast to the modification proposed 
by Denning and Sacco, the beaconized approach eliminates the possibility of a 
replay attack, allows principals to cache commonly used keys and preserves the 
role of the AS as a distributor of public keys. 
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